I don’t know if it is the „correct“ way but I do it the other way around. I have a server and a backup server. Server user can‘t even see backup server but packs a backup, backup server pulls the data with read only access, main server deletes backup, done.
Similar with Promox Backup Server. While Proxmox actively writes the backups to PBS, it’s PBS that decides what to do with the data and how many versions to keep.
For an organisation hosting as many companies data as this one I’d expect automated tape at a minimum. Of course, if the attacker had the time to start messing with the tape that’s lost as well but it’s unlikely.
It depends what’s the pricing. For example ovh didn’t keep any extra backup when their datacenter took fire. But if a customer paid for backup, it was kept off-site and was recovered
It might be even pretending to be a big hosting company when they’re actually renting a dozen deds from a big player, much cheaper than maintaining a data center with 99.999% uptime
Fundamentally there’s no need for the user/account that saves the backup somewhere to be able to read let alone change/delete it.
So ideally you have “write-only” credentials that can only append/add new files.
How exactly that is implemented depends on the tech. S3 and S3 compatible systems can often be configured that data straight up can’t be deleted from a bucket at all.
What’s the correct way to implement it so that it can still be automated? Credentials that can write new backups but not delete existing ones?
I don’t know if it is the „correct“ way but I do it the other way around. I have a server and a backup server. Server user can‘t even see backup server but packs a backup, backup server pulls the data with read only access, main server deletes backup, done.
Similar with Promox Backup Server. While Proxmox actively writes the backups to PBS, it’s PBS that decides what to do with the data and how many versions to keep.
Neat! Thanks for mentioning it!
For an organisation hosting as many companies data as this one I’d expect automated tape at a minimum. Of course, if the attacker had the time to start messing with the tape that’s lost as well but it’s unlikely.
It depends what’s the pricing. For example ovh didn’t keep any extra backup when their datacenter took fire. But if a customer paid for backup, it was kept off-site and was recovered
It might be even pretending to be a big hosting company when they’re actually renting a dozen deds from a big player, much cheaper than maintaining a data center with 99.999% uptime
A tape library that uses a robot arm https://youtu.be/sYgnCWOVysY?t=30s
Backups that are not connected to any device are not susceptible to being overwritten and encrypted by malware.
Or like that vault in Rogue One?
Here is an alternative Piped link(s): https://piped.video/sYgnCWOVysY?t=30s
https://piped.video/sYgnCWOVysY?t=30s
https://piped.video/1RUWtaOzVPg
Piped is a privacy-respecting open-source alternative frontend to YouTube.
I’m open-source, check me out at GitHub.
Here is an alternative Piped link(s): https://piped.video/sYgnCWOVysY
https://piped.video/sYgnCWOVysY
Piped is a privacy-respecting open-source alternative frontend to YouTube.
I’m open-source, check me out at GitHub.
Fundamentally there’s no need for the user/account that saves the backup somewhere to be able to read let alone change/delete it.
So ideally you have “write-only” credentials that can only append/add new files.
How exactly that is implemented depends on the tech. S3 and S3 compatible systems can often be configured that data straight up can’t be deleted from a bucket at all.
i use immutable objects on backblaze b2
from command line using their tool is something like
b2 sync SOURCE BUCKETand from the bucket setting disable object deletion
also borgbase allows this, backups can be created but deletions/overwrites are not permanent (unless you enabled them)